Critics of “Stand Your Ground” (SYG) laws often claim such laws improperly grant the user of defensive force “immunity” from a civil lawsuit for damages.  They sometimes also argue that the “immunity” is better than that given to LEOs.  Neither has yet been shown to be fact.  I doubt either will ever be the general rule. In fact, a state’s “immunity” provision may actually have no relationship to its SYG law.

State “immunity” statutes relating to the use of force are of recent origin and thus, are not yet widely-interpreted by court decisions.  The unanswered questions of interpretation can be rather complicated, but they do not present novel legal concepts. To separate fact from fiction, I “poked around” (a Georgia term for research)  some state statutes. States with statutory provisions which bar civil recovery for damages against a user of reasonable or lawful force include (in no particular order): Georgia, New Hampshire, Michigan, Idaho, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, Colorado, Maryland, Wyoming, Wisconsin, Texas, Mississippi, Kansas, New Jersey, Iowa, and Missouri.

Fact is, a state “immunity” law related to use of force may: Continue reading →

In a prior MSW post I noted that the Supreme Court had agreed to hear what most refer to as a “straw” purchase criminal appeal (Abramski v. United States), see  — “LEGAL NEWS FLASH: Supreme Court to Wade Into “Straw” Purchase Morass.”  [For detailed history and discussion of the case, from Cornell University Law School’s Legal Information Institute, go here.   You can listen to the argument before the Justices (here) or read a transcript here.  An 18-minute audio containing an informative explanation of the case (from The Federalist Society) is here.

As is often the case, oral argument provided little insight into the disposition which would earn the agreement of a majority of the Justices.  Speculation on the decision is no longer necessary — the Court ruled on Monday, June 16.  It held that a “misrepresentation” on Form 4473 is a crime (as if a “straw” purchase), even when the “true buyer” could have lawfully purchased a firearm.   The rationale of the Court’s holding moved away from applying a criminal statute by its words (the preferred mode of analysis) to divining the statute by its and related provisions “structure, history, and purpose.”

The case is not a Second Amendment case.  The majority’s thinking is not without arguable merit: If you are buying a gun “on behalf of” or as “an agent for” another, that person is the “actual transferee/buyer” for the purposes of the federal law under which the Form 4473 was promulgated.  The “guy at the counter” is not.  [Note: A March 2014 lower appellate court opinion (in an unrelated case) ruled similarly, holding that: “Under Form 4473, a person is not the “actual buyer” if the person acquires a firearm for another, even if the person actually pays for the firearm. Rather, the “actual buyer” is the person the firearm ultimately is for”].

Here are the “lessons learned” to take from the drama that is Abramski: Continue reading →

    I write this post as a result of reading a recent news story about a parent in New Hampshire carrying a concealed handgun while waiting near a school to pick up his child (story here).   From that story: “A federal law, Gun-Free Schools Zone Act, prohibits people from carrying a loaded gun, even if that person is properly licensed, within 1,000 feet of a public or parochial school.”  Nope, not the law.   Continue reading →